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Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

KENTUCKY
Camenisch v. City of Stanford, No. 2002-CA-000962-MR, 2003 WL
22025457 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2003) (holding water supply clause in
deed, lacking written grant consistent with the formalities of a deed
and a condition subsequent, was not an easement or a future interest
creating a right of entry or a possibility of reverter, but rather a
covenant that runs with the land).
In 1892 the Rochesters transferred a portion of their property
containing a spring to the Howe Pump and Engine Company
("HPEC"). As consideration for the transfer, HPEC covenanted to
supply water to the Rochester household. The Camenisches were the
Rochester's successors-in-interest. The City of Stanford ("City") was
HPEC's successor-in-interest. In 1996, the City stopped supplying
water to the Camenisches. The Camenisches then filed a complaint
against the City in the Lincoln Circuit Court and moved for summary
judgment. The City answered and also moved for summary judgment.
The Camenisches argued the water supply clause in the deed created
an easement for water rights. The City claimed the water supply clause
either created a condition subsequent or a covenant. The circuit court
granted summary judgment in favor of the City holding the clause
created a condition subsequent and not an easement. In addition, the
circuit court held the Camenishes position taken in a prior suit
estopped them from arguing for anything other than a condition
subsequent. The Camenisches appealed the circuit court decision.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals considered whether the clause
created an easement, condition subsequent, or a covenant. The court
disposed of the easement and condition subsequent arguments by
finding that the water supply clause lacked formalities consistent with a
deed or a condition subsequent; therefore, the water supply clause did
not create an easement or a future interest. With respect to the
interest the water supply clause created, the court held the clause
created a covenant. The City argued that the language in the deed
intended to create a private covenant between only the grantor and
grantee. The City further claimed the language bound the grantees
and not the grantor. The City contended that in order to make a
covenant running with the land the deed must bind the grantor as
well. According to the court, the criteria for deciding if the covenant
runs with the land are: (1) the parties' intent, (2) whether the
covenant must affect or concern the land with which it runs, and (3)
whether privity of estate exists between the party claiming the benefit
and the party who rests under the burden. The court found the deed
language, "as appurtenan [sic] to the land," indicated that the water
supply covenant was intended to run with the land. The court also
noted that even though it is customary to use words of inheritance to
create a covenant that runs with the land, it is not necessary. The
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court concluded that the covenant ran with the land.
The court also reversed the circuit court's holding that the
Camenisches were precluded from arguing anything other than a
condition subsequent. The City claimed the Camnisches argued, in
earlier litigation, that the interest was a condition subsequent and that
the City relied to its detriment on that argument. The City contended
the Camenisches could not now change their position. The court
found in favor of the Camenisches on this issue, holding the City had
every right to its own interpretation of the clause and did not rely to
their detriment on the Camenisches interpretation. Therefore, the
court held the clause created a covenant that ran with the land,
vacated the circuit court's judgment, and remanded the case for the
circuit court to hear other defenses the City intended to employ.
Robert E. Wells

MISSOURI
Edmonson v. Edwards, 111 S.W.3d 906 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (affirming
circuit courtjudgment awarding riparian owner injunctive relief and
damages for injuries sustained when upstream owner of a neighboring
property dammed a stream that flowed through both pieces of land).
R.G. Edmonson and Doug Edwards owned adjoining parcels of
real estate through which a stream flowed. A spring originating north
of both properties fed the stream, which flowed through Edwards's
land across and onto Edmonson's land. Edwards constructed a dam
on the stream to fill two ponds on his property for recreational use.
The dam effectively stopped water flowing to Edmonson's property, as
it completely diverted stream water into the ponds on Edwards's
property. Edmonson filed suit against Edwards in the Barry County
Circuit Court. The circuit court granted Edmonson damages and a
permanent injunction ordering Edwards to dismantle the dam.
Edwards appealed the circuit court's decision.
Edwards asserted on appeal that (1) the circuit court's judgment
denied him reasonable use of the stream, (2) injunctive relief was
improper because Edmonson did not incur any harm, and (3)
Edmonson was not entitled to damages. The Missouri Court of
Appeals initially found that Edwards's brief did not explain how the
legal reasons for his appeal supported the claim of reversible error, as
mandated by Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 84.04(a). However, the court stated that
it nonetheless could look to the argument portion of the brief to
determine whether the circuit court committed plain error that may
have resulted in manifest injustice.
The court first analyzed whether the injunction deprived Edwards
of a reasonable use of the stream by virtue of his riparian ownership.
The court found that what constitutes a reasonable use is a question of

